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ANNUITIES AS A DECUMULATION TOOL
A retiree with retirement savings has several options available for generating consumable income during retirement.
1 One decumulation option is to self-manage the money (whether done alone or with the advice of a financial planner). Here, economists' and financial planners' advice for optimal drawdown is to spend no more than 4% or 5% per year, to avoid running out within thirty years (Bengen 1994) . Another option, and one highly recommended by economics experts, is to convert some portion of accumulated retirement assets into a life annuity.
A life annuity allows a retiree to exchange a lump sum for a guaranteed stream of lifetime payments, thus effectively converting assets into an income stream more similar to a defined benefit (pension) plan. The primary advantages of a life annuity are the implied insurance against outliving one's assets as well as a higher percentage annual return than is normally feasible with self-managed accounts (for example, Brown 2007 models various assumptions and shows that a self-managed "amoritization" strategy at market rates leads to 25% lower income in retirement than a life annuity purchased with equivalent wealth). Thus, people who expect to live longer should find life annuitization particularly attractive, as should individuals who are highly risk averse and want to avoid uncertainty in future income (Poterba and Wise 1996, Milevsky 1998 ).
The higher return associated with a life annuity is a result of survivorship benefits, based on pooling of assets from all contributors being used to support income to annuity holders who continue to live. Perceived disadvantages of life annuities are that the assets are transferred to the issuing company and therefore not available either for transfer to beneficiaries (i.e., bequests)
or for use in case of emergencies (liquidity). To address some of these disadvantages, companies offering life annuities have introduced options such as period-certain guarantees, deferred start dates, annual income increases to compensate for inflation, and joint annuities (e.g., for married 1 Decumulating private retirement savings is not the only source of income because most Americans receive Social Security benefits. Among retirees in the bottom half of the income distribution, Social Security benefits are in fact the majority of their retirement income (Poterba, 2014) .
4 couples). Offering annuities with consumer-oriented options, such as period-certain guarantees, carries financial tradeoffs; the issue for the offering company is whether consumers are willing to accept higher prices in exchange for these benefits.
RESEARCH ON ANNUITY CHOICE
The economics literature has long argued that annuities are the most compelling marketplace solution to the decumulation problem (for a review, see Benartzi et al. 2011 ). Yaari (1965 was one of the first to show that rational retirees with no bequest motive should use all of their retirement assets to buy annuities. Life annuities eliminate "longevity risk"-the risk of outliving one's assets-while also offering a mortality premium on returns, due to the fact that some people in the annuity pool will die early. data, report that only about 6% of households participate in the voluntary annuity market.
Brown (2007) provides a summary of the "economic" answers to the question of why a person might not buy some amount of a life annuity in today's marketplace, including price premiums due to adverse selection by individuals with longer life expectancies, but also argues that annuities are a rational choice for many consumers.
Possible reasons for limited market demand for annuities include rational heterogeneous preferences at the consumer level. Davidoff et al (2005) , Babbel and Merrill (2006), Brown (2007) , and Benartzi et al (2011) all provide comprehensive reviews of how individual preferences may affect annuity demand. For example, the guaranteed monthly income provided through Social Security could lead to less demand for additional annuitization among people with limited retirement savings. However, this does not account for the lack of interest among individuals higher up the wealth distribution. Similarly, an individual's bequest motive might account for less than full annuitization, so that some funds are set aside for beneficiaries, but bequest motives cannot explain the pattern of nearly no annuitization even among people without heirs. Concerns about liquidity to insure against expenditure shocks such as medical expenses could also reduce demand for full annuitization, although demand for bundled contracts of annuity and long-term care that can address these concerns is relatively small. Risks of inflation might also be expected to worry consumers, but evidence from Social Security claims suggests that many consumers have a preference for lump-sum payments rather than inflation-protected payoffs over time that are similar to annuities. Finally, consumers may worry about default risk by the annuity issuer, but reasonable levels of perceived default risk do not account for the relative lack of even partial annuitization.
Thus, although rational economic explanations of the lack of annuitization are important factors in the annuity puzzle, they do not fully explain the problem, and more psychological factors need to be considered (Brown 2007). For instance, some studies have looked at the general framing of the annuity decision. Hu & Scott (2007) argue that people adopt a narrow framing of the problem as a gamble, rather than as an insurance decision, due to the complexity of the annuity purchase task. Loss aversion from cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992 ) is also widely invoked as a reason why annuities are generally less attractive than standard utility theory would predict, especially when considering the loss of the annuity purchase price due to early death. The risk of losing the full value of the annuity due to an unexpected early death is highlighted by not just loss aversion, but also the tendency to overweight small probabilities. Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, & Wrobel (2008) offer a preliminary test of the effects of framing the problem in terms of an investment (using words 6 such as invest and earnings) or in terms of consumption (using words such as spend and payment) and find that consumers like economically equivalent annuities more in the consumption frame. Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach, & Szykman, (2008) also find framing effects, mediated by gender, in a "Retirement Game" in which subjects choose between annuities and self-managed market investments. In our prior work, we have found that information displays that help individuals "do the math" on the cumulative value of annuity payouts can affect both overall interest in annuities and demand for particular annuity attributes (Shu, Zeithammer, and Payne 2016; see also Kunreuther, Pauly, and McMorrow 2013) . These behavioral explanations of the annuity puzzle provide important insights to aspects of the annuity decision, but much more remains to be investigated and tested.
In this paper, we go beyond testing for some of the general judgmental biases and framing effects described above, and conduct an analysis of how measurable individual differences among consumers affect their interest in annuities. In addition to the differences in loss aversion described above, we consider a variety of other individual psychological differences that could affect demand. Schreiber and Weber (2016) show that individual differences in discount factors affect annuity choice. Other aspects of intertemporal choice, such as differential discounting of gains and losses, predictions of resource slack, myopia and hyperopia, construal, procrastination, and/or intertemporal consumption, may also relate to consumers' preference for annuities (e.g., Soman 1998 , Zauberman and Lynch 2005 , Shu 2008 ).
Consumer uncertainty exists for both judgments of future health and economic outcomes (e.g., inflation) and judgments of life expectancy, so capturing individual variation in life expectations is a key input. Building on research on how trust, branding, company ratings, and perceived fairness all affect consumer choices, we measure perceived fairness of annuities as a product (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Seligman and Schwartz 1997, Roth 2007) . Individuals' financial knowledge and literacy, numeracy, and overall cognitive ability also offer important predictions for how consumers who differ in individual ability may react to annuity offerings, so 7 we also include a measure of numeracy (Fernandes, Lynch, and Netemeyer 2014 , Peters et al. 2006 , Frederick 2005 . We measure all of these psychological differences, along with a variety of demographic and financial variables, and analyze how they correlate with individual-level demand for annuities in a hypothetical decumulation scenario among consumers nearing retirement.
OUR STUDIES OF CONSUMER PREFERENCES FOR ANNUITIES
To explore how consumers think about the decumulation problem, and especially how their value differences and belief differences may drive the annuity puzzle, the rest of this paper analyzes data regarding survey results on consumers' preferences for annuities. The data reported here was collected as part of a larger study measuring how consumers value particular attributes of annuities relative to their actuarial value; those results suggested that individual differences were also important to annuity choice (Shu, Zeithammer, and Payne 2016) . While our previous work focused on the value of the individual annuity attributes among consumers who say they would purchase at least some of the annuities our survey offered, this paper contrasts consumers who are willing to consider at least some types of annuities to those who avoid them entirely in our surveys.
Study Implementation: subject recruitment and detailed survey procedure
We completed two separate studies, with different participants per study, to explore the question of who chooses annuities. Study 1 focuses only on how a wide variety of demographics and psychographics affects annuity choice; we also include measures to capture differences in bequest motives, family status, risk aversion, and understanding of annuities. In Study 2, we include a test of an intervention that provides respondents with calculations for the cumulative value of each annuity, in the hopes of increasing overall demand for annuities (as recommended in Kunreuther, Pauly, and McMorrow 2013) . Both studies were constructed as choice-based 8 conjoint analyses (Lenk et al 1996) , in which study participants make a series of twenty choices, with each choice including three described annuities and an outside choice of self-management.
Because the studies are similar in design we report them side by side in the remainder of the paper.
Participants. We recruited participants through a commercial online panel from
Qualtrics. Qualtrics does hundreds of academic research projects and also serves clients such as the US Army and government agencies. Panel members opt-in to Qualtrics through various websites and are offered the opportunity to participate in surveys; Qualtrics does not actively solicit for its panel. For both studies, participation was limited to individuals between the ages of 40 and 65 because this target group is the most appropriate for annuity purchases. We placed no limit on household income or current retirement savings, but we collected data on these characteristics so that we could perform an analysis of how financial status affects preferences.
We also included several demographic questions including age, gender, race, and marital status.
To assess financial literacy, we included eight numeracy and cognitive reflection (CRT)
questions. Finally, we also collected key individual difference measures suggested in the literature to affect liking for annuities, including bequest motives, life expectations, loss aversion, risk aversion, and annuity perceptions such as attitude, desire for control, and perceived fairness.
To reduce the number of respondents who either do not understand the instructions or do not pay attention to the task, we included an attention filter at the start of the survey and excluded participants who did not pass the filter. Procedure. In both studies, participants began by reading short descriptions of the annuity attributes being tested in the conjoint analysis as well as the full range of levels for each of these attributes (see Shu, Zeithammer, and Payne 2016 for more detail on annuity attributes).
They were told the annuities were otherwise identical and satisfactory on all omitted characteristics. They were also told all annuities were based on an initial purchase price of $100,000 at age 65. We then asked each participant to complete 20 choice tasks. To control for order effects, we presented the choice tasks to the participants in a random order.
In each choice task, participants were asked, "If you were 65 and considering putting $100,000 of your retirement savings into an annuity, which of the following would you choose?"
They then saw three annuity options and a fourth option that read, "None: If these were my only options, I would defer my choice and continue to self-manage my retirement assets." Figure 1 provides a sample choice task used in both studies, including the enriched information treatment from one of the conditions in Study 2.
After completing all 20 choice tasks in their assigned condition, participants were asked to fill out a number of additional demographic and psychographic measures. First we asked them how long they expected to rely on their retirement funds, by having them indicate the probability that they would live to ages 65, 75, 85, and 95 . 3 We next collected demographic information including gender, race, marital status, number of children, household income, and retirement assets. To assess financial literacy, we included five numeracy questions and three CRT questions (Weller et al. 2012 , Frederick 2005 . In Study 1, we administered an additional set of questions to measure individual differences in key constructs thought to affect preference for annuities. We collected bequest motives by asking individuals who they would identify as beneficiaries, whether they had formally or informally designated any portion of their savings as inheritance to others, and if so, what proportion of their savings was so designated.
We also asked them to agree or disagree (7-point Likert scale) with statements about the importance of providing inheritance for family members versus financing their own retirement (see Appendix for text of all questions).
Research has suggested perceived fairness is an important consideration for consumers of financial products as well as a strong input into attitude measures for such products; such fairness judgments depend on not just how outcomes are shared between consumers and firms, but also on the transparency and procedural aspects of the system that determines the outcomes (Bies et al. 1993 ). Therefore, in both studies we measured perceived fairness for annuities through both direct questions about fairness (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986) and questions about the process underlying annuities; the inter-item covariance for these factors is high (α = .91) and factor analysis suggests the factor driven by the single-item direct fairness question captures 78% of the overall variance. Thus, for the remainder of this analysis, we use the single-item direct fairness measure as our measure of perceived fairness for annuities.
Specifically, the direct fairness measure asks "Please rate how fair you think a life annuity product is?" on a 4-point scale {Very Unfair, Somewhat Unfair, Acceptable, Completely Fair}.
We measured risk aversion in Study 1 through a series of choices for uncertain annuity income Some of the annuities in our design provided well over $200K in expected NPV payout, in exchange for the $100K price of the annuity (held constant throughout). Therefore, we conclude some people simply dislike the idea of an annuity a priori, and are unwilling to consider these products even with a suggested substantial economic benefit.
As an example of this disliking of high-actuarial-value annuities, consider the three options displayed in the sample task shown in Figure 1 . Taking into account standard mortality rates and an annual discount factor of 0.97, the actuarial value for each annuity is $264,900 for Option A, $174,100 for Option B, and $165,700 for Option C. In Study 1, 41% of respondents selected "none of the above" in this example choice task. In Study 2, 36% of respondents in the basic information condition and 24% of respondents in the enriched information condition selected "none of the above." This strong aversion to annuities with a high actuarial benefit relative to upfront costs (more than would ever be offered in the market, in fact) suggests some individuals are unwilling to consider annuities regardless of the benefit offered. In the next section, we focus on describing these "annuity haters".
Estimation results: Willingness to consider annuities
In this section, we describe how the 283 subjects who chose at least one annuity in Study 12 annuity haters to the rest of the sample using each variable separately. Measured variables are standardized by rescaling them to a value between 0 and 1, except for life expectations which are left in years. The only variable which exhibits a significant difference in both studies is fairness:
in terms of the underlying 4-point fairness scale, annuity haters consider annuities to be "Somewhat unfair", while the rest of the respondents consider them to be closer to "Acceptable".
Study 1 also suggests that annuity-haters are more likely to be female, over 60, more risk-averse, and, perhaps surprisingly, wealthy as measured by retirement savings over $150,000. Study 2 also measured gender, age, and retirement savings, but these significant demographic findings of Study 1 did not replicate (recall that only the basic information condition of Study 2 is relevant as a replication of Study 1). Conversely, Study 2 found a significant difference in numeracy, but Study 1 did not.
We now move from the univariate analysis shown in Table 2 to a logistic regression multivariate analysis. This approach allows the model to take all variables into account simultaneously, and hence control for confounds. In other words, the logistic regression shows the marginal effect of each variable while holding all other variables constant. Table 3 shows results for the three logistic regressions of selecting at least one annuity on individual characteristics versus disliking annuities a priori (the annuity haters) for Study 1 and the two conditions of Study 2. In both studies, most demographics are not significant correlates of buying annuities. In both studies, the exceptions echo the results of the univariate analysis in that choosing at least one annuity is associated with having lower retirement savings and lower riskaversion in Study 1, and with being more numerate in Study 2. It seems that age and genderfound to be significant predictors by the univariate analysis in Study 1 but not by the multivariate analysis of the same data -are merely correlated with other significant explanatory variables.
Interestingly, the multivariate analysis of Study 1 suggests an inverse-U-shape effect of retirement savings 4 , with a significant negative coefficient on individuals with over $150K individuals who perceive annuities to be fair are much more likely to select some in our studies.
The coefficients on fairness are much larger than the coefficients on all other measures, which is meaningful given that the measures have all been standardized to be between 0 and 1. To get a sense of the effect's magnitude, imagine an average respondent in Study 1, who considers annuities to be about half way between "Somewhat Unfair" and "Acceptable", and has a probability of 0.16 of being an annuity-hater according to the estimated logistic regression.
Keeping all variables at their average level while changing the fairness perception to "Completely fair" reduces the person's probability of being an annuity hater to 0.03. Conversely, changing to "Very Unfair" increases the probability of being an annuity hater to 0.56. We also included several other psychological measures in our logistic regression that we expected to influence overall liking of annuities, such as risk aversion, loss aversion, numeracy, and life expectancy. None of these measures had a significant effect on willingness to consider annuities, with the exception of a negative effect of very high levels of risk aversion in Study 1 and a positive effect of numeracy in the basic-information condition of Study 2. It is worth noting that the negative effect of risk aversion is contrary to normative economic theory, which predicts that higher risk aversion should lead to stronger preference for guaranteed life income because an annuity is fundamentally an insurance product.
In addition to evaluating the individual characteristics of which individuals do and do not like annuities in our studies, the results reported in Table 3 also allow us to observe the effect of providing the "enriched" cumulative payout table in the second condition of Study 2. Recall from Figure 1 that the enriched condition "did the math" for participants by multiplying out the monthly payouts (including any annual increases) by number of years to calculate the cumulative payout for various survival ages. In our previous work (Shu, Zeithammer, and Payne 2016) , we found that this enriched information table made participants value particular annuity attributes, such as annual increases, at levels more similar to their full actuarial value. It also increased overall liking of annuities. We also observe that latter result in the data analysis reported here; by comparing the constant estimated for condition 1 of Study 2 ( -2.59) to that of condition 2 (1.29),
we can see a significant drop in the overall percentage of individuals who never choose any annuity at all across our twenty tasks. Put into percentage terms, 20% of participants in condition 1 never chose an annuity (similar to the 22% in Study 1), but this percentage dropped significantly to only 16% of participants in condition 2. These results suggest that providing the enriched table helped our study respondents recognize the overall value of these annuities over time.
DISCUSSION
While the studies reported here are relatively simple in design, they still yield some interesting and novel insights about the types of individuals who do and do not like annuities.
Looking overall at the percentage of individuals who never selected any of the highly valuable annuities across our twenty study tasks, a relatively high percentage (approximately 20%) dislike annuities strongly enough to never select one. Encouragingly, this percentage drops to 16% when an enriched information display is provided that helps individuals recognize the value of the 15 annuities over time. Such a display offers hope to marketers and planners who hope to encourage purchase of annuities that simple changes in how information is provided can be powerful as interventions to increase perceived value.
More novel are the findings about which individual differences are significant predictors of who likes and dislikes annuities. Standard demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, marital status, and income are all insignificant in our data. Characteristics predicted to be important based on traditional economic models, such as health, life expectations, saved assets, and numeracy, are either insignificant or small in their effect. Some measures predicted by traditional models to be important that are significant are actually opposite in the predicted effect, such as risk aversion and well-identified family beneficiaries. We also used this opportunity to test psychological measures such as loss aversion that more recent behavioral models have predicted as important for annuities. Interestingly, the coefficient on high loss aversion is consistently negative across all studies, but not significant, consistent with our prediction that high loss aversion (unlike risk aversion) can help explain dislike of annuities.
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However, by far the strongest of all the individual differences we measured at predicting liking of annuities is the question of whether the individuals think annuities are "fair". Prior research on consumer fairness has suggested that judgments of fairness are affected by the way that profits are shared between the firm and consumer (Kahnaman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986) , the intentions of the firm (Campbell 1999), the firm's perceived wealth and power (Seligman, Schwartz 1997) , and whether underlying costs are variable or fixed (Nunes, Hsee, Weber 2004) .
In this project, our fairness measure was a simple one taken directly from Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) . It is difficult using only this measure to determine what our participants had in mind when they answered the question, or what outside influences might affect these fairness judgments. For example, it is possible that exposure to negative media coverage of other types of annuity products (e.g., variable annuities instead of life annuities) could affect perceptions, as could access (or lack of access) to financial planners who understand the value of the product.
More research is necessary to understand the drivers of these fairness perceptions. From a positive perspective for marketers of these products, however, this suggests that the annuity puzzle is more a problem of perception that of the financial tradeoffs inherent in the product.
Our findings offer several practical implications for financial planners who are working with clients to design optimal decumulation plans for retirement. While economists have argued for the important role of life annuities in retirement, especially as a tool to manage longevity risk and uncertainty, demand by consumers has been limited. Our research identifies which clients
may be most open to the possibility of annuities -specifically, individuals who are less loss averse and consider annuities more fair will be more willing to consider annuity options.
Ongoing research suggests that these individual differences are more important in decumulation decisions than in the accumulation stage , Shu & Shu 2018 ; while most workers agree on the need to save for the future and respond well to standard savings interventions, the decumulation process requires greater personalization to the needs and preferences of the client. As legislators consider making annuities a more available option in workers' 401(k) plans (Rubin and Tergesen 2018) , helping individuals make wise choices about incorporating annuities into their retirement plans will be an increasingly important task. If you were 65 and considering putting $100,000 of your retirement savings into an annuity, which of the following would you choose?
In the enriched information treatment, the following 
